Artificial Person

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Artificial Person

A legal entity that is not a human being but for certain purposes is considered by virtue of statute to be a natural person.

A corporation is considered an artificial person for Service of Process.

See: corporation

ARTIFICIAL PERSON. In a figurative sense, a body of men or company are sometimes called an artificial person, because the law associates them as one, and gives them various powers possessed by natural persons. Corporations are such artificial persons. 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 177.

References in periodicals archive ?
Just like natural persons, artificial persons may be the holders of an amparo action for the protection of the inherent and recognized constitutional rights, such as the right to appear in a court of law, economic rights, freedom of property, the exercise of the action being accomplished by their legal representatives.
As for the possibility of artificial persons to file an amparo suit, it is necessary to specify several aspects.
Secondly, it is necessary to specify that the group of artificial persons which can bring an amparo action to court may include associations and foundations, societies and unions, political parties, as well as political-territorial public authorities.
It is worth noting that even in an Artificial Person, the intermediate level between micro and macro levels allows for the existence of sub-artificial person recursion within a single artificial person.
Insofar as any person is part of more than one artificial person.
The framework will allow any artificial person that encapsulates these traits to participate in the dialogue.
106) For Hobbes the family is also an artificial person, a "body politic.
Artificial persons can be "represented" or "personated" by more than one person, leaving room for equality between male and female rulers who govern jointly.
94) Artificial persons are discussed in more detail below.
Although she concedes the usefulness of artificial persons, it is the moral autonomy of real persons that takes center stage as the "central paradigm" of moral theory: the capacity of persons to make free choices, to be "authentic" in making those choices, and to be located in such conditions and circumstance where they bear responsibility for choices made.
Leaving aside for the moment the issue of artificial persons, "real persons" rarely operate in contexts in which they are not situated in a web of conflicting roles and relationships--parent, friend, lover, or neighbor, for example--and which, in turn, create particular moral duties and expectations in their own right that may have significant bearing on the moral choices made by persons who, acting under different conditions and circumstances, might choose otherwise.
To the extent, then, that institutions or other artificial persons reflect certain moral values--or indeed other social values--they may have some weight in their own right that might plausibly be factored in any normative assessment of the proper conduct of those within them.