Part III traces the line of relevant jus tertii precedent before Kowalski v.
The jus tertii standing inquiry focuses on the plaintiff.
Despite these criticisms, each of the presented purposes of jus tertii standing has merit.
Instead, Justice Douglas stated that the "professional relationship" between the doctor, who brought the suit, and the married couple, the third parties, was sufficient to grant jus tertii standing to assert the married couple's claims.
Moreover, insofar as the applicable constitutional questions have been and continue to be presented vigorously and "cogently," the denial of jus tertii standing in deference to a direct class suit can serve no functional purpose.
130) Powers, therefore, stands as another instance of solid Article III standing and a sympathetic third-party claim overwhelming the jus tertii inquiry.
The second prong of the jus tertii analysis is the "genuine obstacle" or "hindrance" prong.
The homeowner had jus tertii standing to add the claims of black prospective purchasers to his own because he was "the only effective adversary of the unworthy covenant in its last stand.
Because of the resultant difficulty in challenging this statute, the Court found that Baird's jus tertii claim was even stronger than the doctor's in Griswold, where the married couple themselves might be subject to prosecution as users.
148) By granting jus tertii standing in a situation where only ordinary coordination and litigation problems existed (149) and where a member of the class was previously a party, the Court pushed the hindrance prong to its furthest extreme.
Furthermore, the change in the Court's jurisprudence on third-party standing in Kowalski has significantly affected the landscape of jus tertii standing.
This Part describes both cases and the jus tertii holding in each.