Necessary and proper

NECESSARY AND PROPER. The Constitution of the United States, art. 1, s. 8, vests in congress the power "to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, in any department or officer thereof."
     2. This power bas ever been viewed with perhaps unfounded jealousy and distrust. is a power expressly given, which, without this clause, would, be implied. The plain import of the clause is, that congress shall have all incidental and instrumental powers, necessary and proper to carry into execution all the express powers. It neither enlarges any power, specifically granted, nor is it a grant of any new power to congress. It is merely a declaration for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into execution those already granted, are included in the grant.
     3. Some controversy has taken place as to what is to be considered "necessary." It has been contended that by this must be understood what is indispensable; but it is obvious the term necessary means no more than useful, needful, requisite, incidental, or conducive to. It is in this sense the word appears to have been used, when connected with the word "proper." 4 Wheat. 418-420; 3 Story, Const. Sec. 1231 to 1253.

References in classic literature ?
Of these the first is, the "power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
They might have copied the second article of the existing Confederation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any power not EXPRESSLY delegated; they might have attempted a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms "necessary and proper"; they might have attempted a negative enumeration of them, by specifying the powers excepted from the general definition; they might have been altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction and inference.
As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive, the government which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of betraying the public interests by doing nothing, or of violating the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not EXPRESSLY granted.
Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates; accommodated too, not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general power, the PARTICULAR POWERS, which are the means of attaining the OBJECT of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.
It would be as absurd to doubt, that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it.
The interpretive struggle over the meaning of American federalism has shifted from the Commerce Clause to two textually marginal but substantively important battlegrounds: the Necessary and Proper Clause (21) and, to a lesser extent, the General Welfare Clause.
The resurgence of the Necessary and Proper and General Welfare Clauses in the doctrine is not a sign of intellectual impoverishment or a mere result of crafty litigation strategies; neither is it a retreat to the weedy curtilage of the federalism field.
This inquiry increasingly focuses on the shadow powers of Article I: the taxing and spending powers of the General Welfare Clause, and the necessary and proper power.
As I will demonstrate, the novelty of shadow powers analysis lies in the sharp line the Court appears increasingly willing to draw between solid, if controversial, Article I powers such as the commerce power, and auxiliary Article I powers such as the necessary and proper power.
Parts II and III discuss the two principal shadow powers: the necessary and proper power and the taxing and spending powers contained within the general welfare power.
The necessary and proper clause apparently establishes a constitutional standard that legislation rarely meets.
Maryland apparently neutered the framer's misfeasance by reading the necessary and proper clause out of the constitution.