state of affairs

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Generally, states of affairs are independent from one another just in case no state of affairs entails either the existence or the non-existence of any distinct state of affairs.
Causation thus construed is a second-order relation that holds, contingently, between distinct first-order states of affairs.
First-order states of affairs are ontologically primitive and independent from all other distinct states of affairs.
The 'constituents of states of affairs can be sorted into different form-sets' (116) and these form-sets, in turn, into base-sets (188).
Chapter 6 concerns the account of states of affairs defended in the book, its role in generating the account of categories, and the philosophical implications of these accounts.
The terms of the singular causal relation are first-order states of affairs.
The concern is that if it is, then independence (among higher order states of affairs now) will not hold, since a state of affairs (the causal relation) precludes or entails another distinct state of affairs (i.
If loops in time are possible, then causal loops are possible, even a loop so small as to involve only two states of affairs.
The point here is not to raise an objection to the inconceivability thesis--though obviously on this interpretation there are a great many inconceivable but possible states of affairs.
Indeed, there are many states of affairs of which we can form no mental picture, not because of our limitations, but because they are by their very nature inherently unpicturable.
The latter solution consists in "reconstructing reality to embrace negativity" by postulating negative states of affairs and perhaps even negative essences.
The incompatibilist faces a further problem, and it directly concerns the issue of negation's ontological significance, that is, the issue of countenancing negative states of affairs.