truth

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truth

noun accuracy, actuality, authenticity, candor, conformity to fact, correctness, exactness, fact, honesty, integrity, precision, probity, realism, reality, right, sincerity, veracity, veritas, verity
Associated concepts: credibility of a witness, reputation for truth, truth in lending laws
Foreign phrases: Error fucatus nuda veritate in multis, est probabilior; et saepenumero rationibus vincit veriiatem error.Error artfully disguised is, in many instances, more probable than naked truth; and frequently error overwhelms truth by argumentation. Veritas nimium allercando amittitur. Truth is lost by too much altercation. Sacramentum habet in se tres comites,-veritatem, justitiam, et judicium; veritus habenda est in jurato; justitia et justicium in judice. An oath has in it three components,-truth, justice, and judgment; truth in the party swearing; justice and judgment in the judge addinistering the oath. Fictio cedit veritati. fictio juris non est ubi veritas. Fiction yields to truth. where truth is, ficcion of law does not exist. Qui non libere veritatem proounciat proditor est veritatis. He who does not freely speak the truth is a betrayer of the truth. Veritas, quae minime defensatur opprimitur; et qui non improbat, approbat. Truth which is not sufficiently defended is overrowered; and he who does not disapprove, approves. Veritas nihil veretur nisi abscondi. Truth fears nothing but concealment.
See also: fact, honesty, maxim, principle, probity, reality, right, validity, veracity

TRUTH. The actual state of things.
     2. In contracts, the parties are bound to toll the truth in their dealings, and a deviation from it will generally avoid the contract; Newl. on Contr. 352-3; 2 Burr. 1011; 3 Campb. 285; and even concealment, or suppressio veri, will be considered fraudulent in the contract of insurance. 1 Marsh. on Ins. 464; Peake's N. P. C. 115; 3 Campb. 154, 506.
     3. In giving his testimony, a witness is required to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; for the object in the examination of matters of fact, is to ascertain truth.
     4. When a defendant is sued civilly for slander or a libel, he may justify by giving the truth in evidence; but when a criminal prosecution is instituted by the commonwealth for a libel, he cannot generally justify by giving the truth in evidence.
     5. The constitutions of several of the United States have made special provisions in favor of giving the truth in evidence in prosecutions for libels, under particular circumstances. In the constitutions of Pennsylvania, Delaware, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, it is declared, that in publications for libels on men in respect to their public official conduct, the truth may be given in evidence, when the matter published was proper for public information. The constitution of New York declares, that in all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous, is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted. By constitutional provision in Mississippi and Missouri, and by legislative enactment in New Jersey, Arkansas, Tennessee, Act of 1805, c. 6: and Vermont, Rev. Stat. tit. 11, c. 25, s. 68; the right to give the truth in evidence has been more extended; it applies to all prosecutions or indictments for libels, without any qualifications annexed in restraint of the privilege. Cooke on Def. 61.

References in periodicals archive ?
For Misak, it is Peircean pragmatism, not deflationism, that successfully replaces 'metaphysical' theories of truth with healthy naturalism.
We should also distinguish theories of truth from theories of
In the coherence theories of truth propounded by Bradley and Joachim and the historicism of Croce (so influential on later British idealism) and Collingwood, we see a proliferation of unorthodox, Hegelian epistemological views.
Another, more substantive concern for the functionalist is that he cheerfully takes on most if not all of the problems with each and every one of the canonical, competing theories of truth that he attempts to reconcile.
The first piece of evidence is that the existence of two contradictory theories of truth in Hobbes' philosophy is due to the fact that, on the one hand, the conventional view--that truth is a coherent use of names arbitrarily defined--is supported by the political stance in favour of absolutism, since the king must be able to define, even without regard for truth, what 'justice', 'goodness', etc.
Brandom argues for a reevaluation of correspondence theories of truth by holding that what matters much more in the debate is the unity of propositional content exhibited in knowledge, which must be enabled by reason's power of inference.
Priest deals with this objection by considering a number of theories of truth, including deflationism, the semantic conception, the teleological theory, the pragmatist theory, the coherence theory, and the correspondence theory, and arguing that none of them is incompatible with dialetheism, and some of them even point in its direction.
Semantic theories of truth, which are merely sophisticated versions of correspondentism, fail.