References in periodicals archive ?
Permitting blackmail will encourage B to threaten a disclosure he would not make if blackmail were illegal.
By definition, permitting opportunistic blackmail does not cause any investment of resources, wasteful or otherwise, into acquiring information for blackmail purposes.
The Love of Gossip: Why a Blackmail Ban Produces Excessive Disclosure
Assuming perfect enforcement, the blackmail ban prevents the subject of information--the blackmail victim--from paying to preserve its secrecy.
Absent consideration of norms, I assume that this analysis is correct in concluding that the ban on blackmail will produce excessive disclosure.
Asymmetric Transaction Costs: Why a Lawful Blackmail Market Would Produce Excessive Secrecy
After B discovers V's secret, B can negotiate with V for a blackmail (secrecy) contract,(100) or with TP for a disclosure contract.
But a free market in blackmail would actually produce excessive secrecy.
In the blackmail scenario, there are likely to be more TPS than Vs.
106) Reputation is one solution, but in the context of opportunistic blackmail B is not likely to have a reputation as a person who always names a fair price for his information.
But while a contractual solution is effective in situations where TP's use of the information is easy to define and verify, much blackmail information concerns embarrassing facts that are useful merely by knowing of their existence.
Note that where B knows a secret of V-the blackmail situation--the law does not prohibit B from selling that secret to TP.