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n], compose a four-dimensional object that exemplifies [Q.
In other words, the atomic temporal parts that P* has for the first eighty years of her life are exactly like (in intrinsic features and restricted atomic-temporal-part-to-atomic-temporal-part relations) the atomic temporal parts that wholly compose P.
In either case, the existence of a conscious person does not supervene on the features of, and interrelations among, the atoms that compose her, and so some common assumptions about psychophysical supervenience are false.
But if the less ambitious version is true and MS is false, then whether atoms compose some object or other does not supervene on the features of those atoms and the restricted atom-to-atom relations they exemplify.
Either microindiscernible macrophysical objects can differ with respect to their intrinsic qualitative properties or whether atoms compose some object does not supervene on the features of, or causal and spatiotemporal interrelations among, those atoms.
n] compose O, and O exemplifies certain qualitative intrinsic properties.
The second thesis of MS is the non-trivial assertion that whether atoms compose an object supervenes on restricted atom-to-atom relations.
If MS is false, those atoms might not compose an object, or, if they do, that object might have no mental life and thus, presumably, would not be a person.