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First order logic does not distinguish between different forms of universal generalizations; in this paper it is argued that lawlike and accidental generalizations (broadly construed) have a different logical form, and that this distinction is syntactically marked in English.
McDowell's dialectic in Mind and World is expounded and reviewed, hinging on the notion of "conceptual second nature" as his suggested way of showing that there is nothing mysteriously nonnatural in human animals learning to find their way about both in a world characterised by lawlike connections and in one characterised by rational connections.
They argued that uniform experience shows that lawlike behavior is highly probable, but does not warrant the conclusion that miracles are altogether impossible.
So, the first remark seems to imply that the understanding could not operate in a lawlike manner in such a world and that seems to mean that it could not form and deploy concepts in such a world.
that it is essentially necessitarian and/or lawlike.
reason, a lawlike need (ein gesetzliches Bedurfnis) before which all
The volume begins with a 1973 paper that analyzes wanting in terms of seven lawlike propositions.
His argument against "probabilistic uniformitarianism," the idea that all events can be characterized in a way that lets their occurrence be probabilistically definitively related to earlier events in a lawlike way, is that such a belief in unrelativized, determinate, lawlike probabilities is "mere dogma," the residue of deterministic prejudices.
What this claim rules out is that there could be a predicate or concept F such that we understand F and it is nomologically impossible for any instances of F to impinge upon us in lawlike ways through experience.
28) Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, 257-62; Vlastimil Vohanka, "Are Standard Lawlike Propositions Metaphysically Necessary?
Stoeger writes: "As we move into the science of complex chemical molecules, into biology, neurophysiology, psychology, economics, politics, and sociology, these problems increase and prevent us from describing phenomena in anything like the lawlike and rigidly predictable way to which we are accustomed in physics and mathematics.
The behaviorist's tactic of only attending to lawlike connections between observable events is comparable to resting satisfied with the knowledge that the Big Bang is responsible for the present state of the cosmos and not giving a hoot about what has gone on in between.