This Article extends that discussion to the SG's amicus filings in later reapportionment and other election law cases.
A full understanding of the Reapportionment Revolution also requires an appreciation of actors affected by the cases, but not directly involved in a particular case.
Nonetheless, the possibility of congressional action has played a prominent role in reapportionment litigation.
Congressional Reaction to the Reapportionment Cases in the 1960s
As previously observed, (115) the standard account is that some opposition in Congress arose in the immediate aftermath of the reapportionment cases, but it soon melted away given the popularity of those decisions and the lack of support for restrictions within Congress itself.
Numerous bills were introduced in both chambers, which would have variously limited the jurisdiction of the federal courts over reapportionment cases, or delayed the implementation of court orders requiring reapportionment.
The reapportionment decisions were also discussed in the 1964 presidential campaign.
Application of these factors sheds greater light on the response of Congress to the reapportionment cases and the ultimate failure of the constitutional and statutory proposals to overturn or limit the decisions or restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
How much did the Supreme Court react to the anticipated or actual congressional opposition when rendering the reapportionment cases?
All of the reapportionment decisions starting with Baker were direct appeals from decisions of three-judge district courts, and the Court could not have been unaware of that fact and the rapid nature of appeals from such decisions, as compared to the normal appellate process.
The Three-Judge District Court in Reapportionment and Voting Rights Act Cases
The story of the institution of the three-judge district court illustrates how Congress has influenced reapportionment litigation by providing a special forum for the litigation of those cases.