self-evident proposition


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See: principle
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Perhaps these philosophers think that a self-evident proposition must be obvious, and note that reflective, thoughtful people would not disagree about something that is obvious.
Prior to this sort of confrontation, one may be justified in one's belief simply because of having understood a self-evident proposition.
On this view, understanding a self-evident proposition renders us prima facie justified in believing the proposition.
Moore holds that the claims about goodness discussed above are self-evident, and he defines a self-evident proposition as one that is "evident or true by itself alone; that it is not an inference from some proposition other than itself.
The standard answer to this question is to insist that some moral beliefs have as their content propositions that are selfevident, (3) where self-evident propositions are those true propositions such that "if one adequately understands them, then by virtue of that understanding one is justified in believing them.
Often, dialectical arguments can be advanced either for or against putatively self-evident propositions.
In contrast, the predicate in a self-evident proposition belongs to the subject in virtue of no other term.
That a self-evident proposition does not have the potencies of a conclusion within a science is explained by Aquinas in an important text from his commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics:
The claim that a self-evident proposition is both actually and potentially one, in contrast to a non-self-evident or demonstrable proposition that is actually one yet potentially two propositions, is an important one for our present investigation, for we have suggested above that all propositions are actually unities, but that the different kinds of potencies of the actual unity of the proposition allow us to distinguish between self-evident and non-self-evident propositions of a science.
The fact that a self-evident principle's potential divisibility is exhausted by the analysis into subject and predicate, in contrast to the analysis of a P2 proposition into other propositions, leads Aquinas to speak of the self-evident proposition at times as a simple indivisible (simplex indivisibilis) (58) and indivisible unity (unum indivisibile).
Other key expressions complete Aquinas's account, for he will contend that a self-evident proposition is known immediately (statim) upon the cognition of its terms.
In sum, the book is a very fine presentation of an important topic and will be useful for all Thomistic scholars as well as anyone concerned with the notion of self-evident propositions.