supervene

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We cannot summarize all his arguments for Buddhist Reductionism, but his distinction between reductive and nonreductive supervenience is relevant (Persons).
law is the kind of thing that must have a particular supervenience base.
Thus, a large part of the territory can be covered by looking at samples of the following types of theory: emergence, supervenience, (3) constitution, and animalism.
The paper investigates whether causation is extrinsic in Humean Supervenience (HS) in the sense that being caused by is an intrinsic relation between token causes and effects.
Ethical supervenience is defined thus: 'If an act or agent falls under ethical concept E, it does so in virtue of falling under non-ethical concepts, N, such that, necessarily, what falls under N falls under E' (49).
In this comment, it would seem to imply that the human properties cannot be understood solely in terms of of emergentism or supervenience as currently encountered in literature in analytic philosophy of mind.
Anyone who believes in free will seems implicitly committed to the reality of conscious mental states, and neuroscience places a burden on the folk psychologist to come up with something like a supervenience relation.
The final section deals with metaphysics and science and includes chapters on absolute and relational space; infinity and metaphysics; the passage of time; the direction of time; causation; laws and dispositions; determinism and probability; essences and natural kinds; metaphysics and relativity; metaphysics and quantum physics; supervenience, reduction, and emergence; biometaphysics; social entities; the mental and the physical; and the self.
Supervenience challenges ontological naturalism, demanding an epistemology not founded solely on causal principles.
Gibbard's argument for supervenience starts with the observation that plans must specify situations and actions in terms of their prosaically factual properties (indeed Gibbard thinks we must ultimately cash out situations and actions in terms of observational properties).
If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe their supervenience on?
The difference between what is fitting and what merely seems fitting is secured by supervenience and publicity constraints on judgment.