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AMPLIATION, civil law. A deferring of judgment until the cause is further examined. In this case, the judges pronounced the word amplius, or by writing the letters N.L. for non liquet, signifying that the cause was not clear. In practice, it is usual in the courts when time is taken to form a judgment, to enter a curia advisare vult; cur. adv. vult. (q.v.)

AMPLIATION, French law. Signifies the giving a duplicate of an acquittance or other instrument, in order that it may be produced in different places. The copies which notaries make out of acts passed before them, and which are delivered to the parties, are also called ampliations. Dict. de Jur. h.t.

References in periodicals archive ?
What grounds this interpretation of Frege as agreeing with Kant in holding ampliative reasoning to "depend" on entities?
The key question to support the ampliative step in IBE is to realize that "theory-choice operates within and is guided by a network of background knowledge".
There is no exceptionless guarantee in ampliative logic and because of this looking for a counterexample is not part of the strategy.
He even noted the ampliative character of resource-bounded, nondemonstrative reasoning, compared to nonampliative paradigms.
Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929) 51: "Upon such synthetic, that is, ampliative principles, all our a priori speculative knowledge must ultimately rest .
Ampliative epistemological virtues such as consistency with a successful research program can be involved in a scientist's theoretical commitments.
We may be in a position to give an answer on the basis of what we already believe either by deductive or by ampliative (roughly: inductive) inference.
All such reasoning is ampliative and--as we all too often discover to our dismay--is both non-demonstrative and non-additive.
This Breazeale calls the 'phenomenological-synthetic' method, thus denoting both its performative and its ampliative nature.
283), opposing probabilism of the sort widely endorsed by philosophers who embrace Bayesianism, supportive of the importance of forming testable conjectures, but in opposition to both probabilists and Popperians in favoring ampliative induction.
But if your goal is to draw conclusions that go beyond what the premisses assert, then Modus ponens is not what you should use --you should use an ampliative mode of inference instead.
In trying to show that the ampliative rules of science don't universally underdetermine theory choice, he gives a historical example: the resolution of the debate between Newtonian and Cartesian physics.