Commutative justice

COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE. That virtue whose object is, to render to every one what belongs to him, as nearly as may be, or that which governs contracts.
     2. The word commutative is derived from commutare, which signifies to exchange. Lepage, El. du Dr. ch. 1, art. 3, Sec. 3. See Justice.

A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. By John Bouvier. Published 1856.
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(82) As Allan Beever (2013) argues, this core meaning of justice, the commutative justice associated primarily with private law and with the horizontal obligations among private persons to render each other his or her due, has been increasingly "forgotten" and obscured in modern political philosophy.
As second misunderstanding of general justice effectively reduces it to a form of commutative justice. In this analysis the argument is that there are duties in justice to the common good beyond what the law requires but this is because members of a community receive benefits that they are bound in justice to repay.
This objection no longer convinced Lessius because he thought that it did not matter from the point of view of commutative justice with whom the contract was concluded.
In the article "The Praxis of Commutative Justice. Composition and conceptual recomposition in Old and New Spain.
That justice, according to him, must be understood not merely as 'commutative justice' but as 'the way things ought to be' (emphasis his).
Commutative justice is largely negative, meaning that it can be accomplished by not doing something.
Imperfect rights are rights only in a "metaphorical sense." They favor special interest groups at the expense of the general welfare, refer to distributive not commutative justice, and violate property rights.
Drawing on the historical and jurisprudential work of James Gordley, John Finnis, John Goldberg, and Benjamin Zipursky, I argue that the twentieth century trend away from an understanding of tort law as a manifestation of Aristotelian commutative justice (or simply tort as a "wrong") has deprived tort law of an adequate account of intentional wrongdoing.
Is his understanding of formal or commutative justice (always demanding a restitution of injustices and only indicating what one person is due from another under generally accepted conditions) weakened or seriously damaged by the introduction of that omnipresent phrase "social justice"?
We relate on a one-to-one basis (commutative justice); individuals relate to the social whole (social justice); and the representatives of the social whole relate back to individuals (distributive justice).
Some recent interpretations maintain that Smith resolved the Aristotelian-Scholastic dichotomy by combining commutative and distributive justice: they assert in particular that effective commutative justice could work also as a (form of) just distribution (62).
His articulation of commutative justice is noteworthy, but his treatment of distributive justice remains vague and unconvincing.