Commutative justice

COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE. That virtue whose object is, to render to every one what belongs to him, as nearly as may be, or that which governs contracts.
     2. The word commutative is derived from commutare, which signifies to exchange. Lepage, El. du Dr. ch. 1, art. 3, Sec. 3. See Justice.

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Table 1: Definitions of Justice Scholastic Term Modern Term Definition Justice Justice To give what is owed Commutative Justice Commutative Justice What is owed between two persons in exchange Distributive Justice None Obligations between a community and its mem- bers, divided into general and particular justice General Justice Social Justice What the members of a or Legal Justice community owe to that community Particular Justice Distributive Justice What a community owes to its members
11) On the other hand, in Aquinas, the specific forms of justice fall into two types: distributive justice and commutative justice.
First, he is going to see to the natural-law precept that in commercial relationships commutative justice (iustitia commutativa) should prevail, implying that in any exchange equality (aequalitas) between what is given and received is to be preserved.
It pays careful attention to the definition of justice by classical philosophers and accounts for the distributive scope of commutative justice.
Because, then, money changing is concerned with the exchange of coins, it is necessary to preserve in it the canons of commutative justice just as is done in other exchanges.
Thus, it was recognized that it was impossible, usually, to have an exact mathematical relationship, even though Aristotle spoke of distributive justice in terms of geometric proportion and commutative justice, the second form of justice, in terms of mathematical proportion.
After making the general observation that monetary exchanges fall under commutative justice, Cajetan does three things: (1) he divides monetary exchanges into two basic types, (2) he considers whether and how conditions of place affect such exchanges, and (3) he considers whether and how conditions of time affect such changes.
the word coincides with what Aristotle and the Schoolmen call commutative justice.
Drawing on the historical and jurisprudential work of James Gordley, John Finnis, John Goldberg, and Benjamin Zipursky, I argue that the twentieth century trend away from an understanding of tort law as a manifestation of Aristotelian commutative justice (or simply tort as a "wrong") has deprived tort law of an adequate account of intentional wrongdoing.
It is not loose, vague, and indeterminate, but precise and accurate; it engenders only a negative range of blame--there is no praise for abiding by commutative justice.
They favor special interest groups at the expense of the general welfare, refer to distributive not commutative justice, and violate property rights.
Is his understanding of formal or commutative justice (always demanding a restitution of injustices and only indicating what one person is due from another under generally accepted conditions) weakened or seriously damaged by the introduction of that omnipresent phrase "social justice"?