Thus, the automaton operation algorithm can be changed directly in the computational process.
The possibility of dynamic reconfiguration (reprogramming) of an OA-automaton in the course of the computational process is thus realized.
Because the OA-approach for organizing the computational process is very flexible, FU of new types can be added to the OA-environment without violation of the entire environment integrity.
The computational process
allows obtaining precise position even on the basis of processing of a single observational epoch only.
To take what might seem like a facetious example, it would seem that taking a photograph, or even passing a photograph from one person to another, is a computational process on Hutchins's view.
The more interesting point here, I think, is that Hutchins has perhaps inadvertently avoided addressing one of the more difficult and currently more topical issues in cognitive science: just what is a computational process or system, and what sorts of processes are (and are not) computational?
In addition, the computational process
is strictly directed by the chaining of individual productions, and the steps of the process can be isolated and identified with individual productions.
For example, in ants and bees the computational process of dead reckoning (which integrates velocity with respect to time) takes as inputs the animal's solar heading, forward speed, and a representation of the solar azimuth, producing as output a representation of the creature's position relative to some landmark .
If the solar heading, the forward speed and the sun itself are representations that are inputs to a computational process, then wide computationalism is true.
Wide computationalism is appropriate in cases in which the interaction between an individual and something external to that individual is a crucial part of the computational process being described as an explanans in psychology.
For example, in ants and bees the computational process of dead reckoning (which integrates velocity with respect to time) takes as inputs the animal's solar heading, forward speed, and a representation of the solar azi muth, producing as output a representation of the creature's position relative to some landmark, such as a nest.
Figuring out the computational structure to an organism's environment, while methodologically necessary, is peripheral to an understanding of the nature of learning itself, and suggests that there is no deep sense in which Gallistel advocates a view of learning as a wide computational process.