In my view this distinction between participating in esse
commune and in esse
subsistens is very important within Aquinas's theory of transcendental participation, and is something that Fabro did not bring out quite as explicitly as one might have wished in his truly groundbreaking works on participation.
For both positions well-known female professors have been elected, each with extensive experience in ESSE.
The new ESSE President as of January 2013 is Professor Liliane Louvel, Professor Emerita of English Literature at the University of Poitiers (France), who has been extraordinarily active in ESSE as a member of its Board for six years (2004-2010) and Vice President and President of the French association (SAES) for another eight years (20022010).
The angel is himself a subsisting form in his natural being (in esse naturali), but his species in the intellect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only an intelligible existence (esse intelligibile).
Indeed, the question of the cognizant form's having existence in esse intentionali does not enter into the picture at all.
Presently, I note that even if it were used this way (that is, as equivalent to "esse intelliligibile"), we still could not conclude from this usage that esse intentionale as such is the criterion of cognizance, since in the case of the angel the esse intentionale in question exists at the same time in esse immateriali.
(21) Intelligible being is simply "being in an intellect", being "actually intelligible"; it is a mode of being proper to an intellectual knower as such, and is a feature of Thomas's doctrine that "the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower." (22) Any existence in an intellect is existence in esse intelligibili.
(80) For it therefore results that all things other than God are not their esse, but share in esse; and so it is necessary that all things, which are diversified according to a diverse participation in esse, in such a way that they are more or less perfectly, (81) be caused by a first being (ens) which is in a most perfect way.
As Thomas indicates a few pages later, the substantial esse of a thing is nothing other than the esse that it has in virtue of its substantial form: "Prima perfectio ignis consistit in esse quod habet per suam formam substantialem"; STh I, q.
In other words, he has now extended the limitation principle once more to that which participates in esse, since such a thing can do so only to the degree marked out for it by its nature or essence and, therefore, only to a finite degree.(36)
However, if something possesses the infinite power to exist (infinitam virtutem ad essendum) only according to an esse that is participated in from something else, insofar as it participates in esse, it is finite.
Other existents only participate in esse in limited fashion.