intentionality

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Related to Intentional state: Theory of intentionality
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IC4: Dualism does not have a similar problem in accounting for the existence of intentional states, and that is true even if intentionality cannot be determined by interactions among items of whatever nature--whether physical or nonphysical.
But there seem to be many apparently intentional states whose content is not given by a complete sentence.
02's hierarchy of intentional states is fault, not eligibility.
How, once linguistic meanings are jettisoned along with intentional states, how we are to conceive of the determinants of truth value?
Criminal offense definitions include elements that are intentional states, even in a penal code that is not premised on the view that an intentional state should ordinarily be proved in connection with each and every material element.
In this article I have argued that seemings constitute a distinct and important category of intentional states that has yet to be fully examined.
1) For a sketch of the reasons I favour for rejecting eliminativism about intentional states, see Jackson and Pettit 1993b.
Fodor does not justify contention (2), and I believe that he takes it to be self-evident: being the same intentional state simply is having the same intentional content, for what makes an intentional state the intentional state that it is is its intentional content.
Even if it were true that descriptions of intentional states could be replaced by extensional descriptions, it might not be true that behavioural hypotheses could be specified extensionally.
Bipartism is the common view that the nature of an intentional state can be wholly explained in terms of (a) its horizontal relations with other such states (as well as peripheral inputs and outputs); and Co) its vertical relations with the world.
Emotions are understood as intentional states involving propositional content which is both factual and evaluative.
Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content.