intentionality

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IC4: Dualism does not have a similar problem in accounting for the existence of intentional states, and that is true even if intentionality cannot be determined by interactions among items of whatever nature--whether physical or nonphysical.
But even once we put these relational states to one side, there seems to be a large class of intentional states which are neither relations nor propositional attitudes.
Eligibility is the concern in doctrines of excuse, such as insanity, Fault is an aspect of wrongdoing that is best (but not necessarily) described in terms of intentional states. See Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ.
Voluntary intoxication, therefore, should be admissible to disprove any level of fault that is premised on an intentional state. In other words, voluntary intoxication operates in the same way that an unreasonable mistake operates within the intentionalist construction of fault.
In this article I have argued that seemings constitute a distinct and important category of intentional states that has yet to be fully examined.
(1) For a sketch of the reasons I favour for rejecting eliminativism about intentional states, see Jackson and Pettit 1993b.
The upshot seems to be that there is no ontologically real, intrinsic intentionality available to her, to help address how our mental states truly can be together with their intended objects in reality, or to preserve the essential features of intentional states. Accordingly, it seems that, on her ontology, our mental states and their intended objects cannot be together.
I believe that the argument is not valid, since it equivocates on the phrase "the same intentional state".
Even if it were true that descriptions of intentional states could be replaced by extensional descriptions, it might not be true that behavioural hypotheses could be specified extensionally.
Emotions are understood as intentional states involving propositional content which is both factual and evaluative.
Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content.
The individuation of intentional states of mind is irreducibly normative (the intentional is normative).