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noun accuracy, actuality, authenticity, candor, conformity to fact, correctness, exactness, fact, honesty, integrity, precision, probity, realism, reality, right, sincerity, veracity, veritas, verity
Associated concepts: credibility of a witness, reputation for truth, truth in lending laws
Foreign phrases: Error fucatus nuda veritate in multis, est probabilior; et saepenumero rationibus vincit veriiatem error.Error artfully disguised is, in many instances, more probable than naked truth; and frequently error overwhelms truth by argumentation. Veritas nimium allercando amittitur. Truth is lost by too much altercation. Sacramentum habet in se tres comites,-veritatem, justitiam, et judicium; veritus habenda est in jurato; justitia et justicium in judice. An oath has in it three components,-truth, justice, and judgment; truth in the party swearing; justice and judgment in the judge addinistering the oath. Fictio cedit veritati. fictio juris non est ubi veritas. Fiction yields to truth. where truth is, ficcion of law does not exist. Qui non libere veritatem proounciat proditor est veritatis. He who does not freely speak the truth is a betrayer of the truth. Veritas, quae minime defensatur opprimitur; et qui non improbat, approbat. Truth which is not sufficiently defended is overrowered; and he who does not disapprove, approves. Veritas nihil veretur nisi abscondi. Truth fears nothing but concealment.
See also: fact, honesty, maxim, principle, probity, reality, right, validity, veracity

TRUTH. The actual state of things.
     2. In contracts, the parties are bound to toll the truth in their dealings, and a deviation from it will generally avoid the contract; Newl. on Contr. 352-3; 2 Burr. 1011; 3 Campb. 285; and even concealment, or suppressio veri, will be considered fraudulent in the contract of insurance. 1 Marsh. on Ins. 464; Peake's N. P. C. 115; 3 Campb. 154, 506.
     3. In giving his testimony, a witness is required to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; for the object in the examination of matters of fact, is to ascertain truth.
     4. When a defendant is sued civilly for slander or a libel, he may justify by giving the truth in evidence; but when a criminal prosecution is instituted by the commonwealth for a libel, he cannot generally justify by giving the truth in evidence.
     5. The constitutions of several of the United States have made special provisions in favor of giving the truth in evidence in prosecutions for libels, under particular circumstances. In the constitutions of Pennsylvania, Delaware, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, it is declared, that in publications for libels on men in respect to their public official conduct, the truth may be given in evidence, when the matter published was proper for public information. The constitution of New York declares, that in all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous, is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted. By constitutional provision in Mississippi and Missouri, and by legislative enactment in New Jersey, Arkansas, Tennessee, Act of 1805, c. 6: and Vermont, Rev. Stat. tit. 11, c. 25, s. 68; the right to give the truth in evidence has been more extended; it applies to all prosecutions or indictments for libels, without any qualifications annexed in restraint of the privilege. Cooke on Def. 61.

References in periodicals archive ?
While Badiou, like Brouwer, insists on liberating mathematics from the superstitious supposition that it concerns objects that are 'external' to mathematics, and identifying mathematical truth with the very movement of its thought, for the former, the axiom is precisely the point at which mathematical intuition in concentrated.
Turing, apparently, rejected the idea of mathematical truth.
256) that his result demonstrated a superlative capacity of the human mind to grasp mathematical truths in excess of the powers of any formal system.
Acknowledging, however, that this definition of rationality is not immediately useful in the case of mathematics, since there is no independent notion of mathematical truth that would provide a meaning for 'ends', Kitcher is thus obliged to give his story another dubiously empirical twist by introducing as a pivotal notion the idea of an "epistemic end.
Note that Frege does not base his rejection of nondeductive reasoning in arithmetic on a dogmatic identification of mathematical truth with provability, but on an internal property of the natural numbers themselves.
Once we have taken due account of this, we shall see that the real problem with the default view of mathematical truths is not either of the two traditional problems identified above, but rather a problem that cannot be properly addressed until those two have been recognized as spurious.
The referential questions (along with applicability) are solved by his allowing mathematics only a very weak notion of posits - "ultrathin posits" he calls them - according to which mathematical objects, as well as mathematical truth, are metaphysically inert (we might call this a deflationary platonism").
To my mind, however, Weir's argument in Chapter 5 (to the effect that applied mathematical theories are free of ontological commitments to abstract entities) works only if such theories are made true or false by a combination of the world and concrete proof tokens--that is, if mathematical truth and falsity genuinely "bottom out" in concrete proof or refutability.
His theology deemphasized the core dogmas of Christianity and indeed the figure of Christ himself, settling instead on a broad monotheistic faith in which the quest for mathematical truth and the quest to know God were identical.
More than that, the question has exposed a gaping hole in the foundations of mathematics and has led mathematicians to reexamine the very nature of mathematical truth.
As long as certain presuppositions are made, the formulation in terms of mathematical truth (which I will give below) will be equivalent to the one in terms of mathematical existence.
It tackles the long-standing issue of the justification of the status of mathematical truth, focusing on the 'Euclidean triangle' problem: how, precisely, does a person prove a general property of all triangles, through proofs which rely on diagrams of a particular triangle?

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