After all, if omissions cannot be causes, then the "injustices" that might be attributed to not punishing omitters (which he mentions in his exception to his normative claim) must be caused by some other metaphysical entity and cannot be properly attributed to the omission or to the omitter.
One may object that it sounds odd to say that an omission is voluntary when the omitter simply forgets to perform the required action.
To use her example again: We may kill a person who is drowning a baby in order to prevent the baby's death whereas we may not kill an omitter even if that will save the baby she is omitting to save (for example, by giving an incentive to the person standing next to her not to continue to omit to save the baby).
My fear is that we are not testing anything but pure retributive intuitions about comparative deserts: we may do more to prevent the would-be killer's killing than we may to induce an omitter to save a life because killing a killer is less wrong than killing an omitter;(191) but this last is only true because killers have greater moral deserts than omitters.
are generally less culpable than committers; perhaps the kinds of things done omissively are generally less grave than things done through commission; perhaps both claims are true.
prevent than are those allowers or omitters
we now call principals
Each group of inaccurate customers in Table 3 can be divided into further categories: core customer omitters
versus new customer omitters
and projecting nonbuyers (non-converting catalog requesters) versus telescoping nonbuyers (lapsed buyers).