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An important difference with the original proposal regarding the dissociation between consciousness and attention is that here we explain how it is not only the case that phenomenal consciousness is valuable, morally and aesthetically (independently of the epistemic functions of attention and access to semantic contents) but also that this dissociation has historical and social consequences.
A proponent of this kind of reductionism is Jesse Prinz, whose general theory of phenomenal consciousness implies a restrictivist view on cognitive phenomenology.
Moody noted, the "consciousness, phenomenal consciousness in this case, just is not like anything else" (Moody Todds, 1986), and therefore can't be completely reduced to or explained in physicalist terms.
The moot question is where does information fit into this canvas of self-consciousness, phenomenal consciousness and reflexive consciousness of the being?
10) Antony (2008) presents an argument in favor of the claim that phenomenal consciousness is precise in the intended sense.
Comparing this to Patanjali's model where obscured phenomenal consciousness is already fully aligned with the light of never-collapsing pure consciousness resolves to seeing Jung's whole model as resting on a very shaky foundation, or false view.
For example, Block's (2002) phenomenal consciousness is not composed of experiential properties such as sensations and perceptions (contents of p-consciousness), but rather refers to one being p-conscious of experiential properties such as sensations and perceptions.
One widespread and currently debated distinction is between phenomenal consciousness (what it is like to be or to experience something) on the one hand and computational, functional information-processing consciousness (a scientific account in objective terms) on the other.
In one version, considerations of conceivability are taken to support the claim that phenomenal consciousness is not identical to, realized by, or supervenient on physical properties (for example, Kripke 1972, Nagel 1974, Robinson 1993, White 1986, Jackson 1998, and Chalmers 1996).
Phenomenal consciousness is a matter of what it's like to have conscious experiences.
The author's own discussion of consciousness is frustrated by his tendencies to assimilate notions like intentionality, understanding and rationality to phenomenal consciousness, and to insist on the primitive status of the latter.
And whereas Bernard Baars and David Chalmers cite 'global availability' as an important constraint on what counts for phenomenal consciousness in humans (31), Metzinger argues that this criterion is not simple, but covers at least three separate things: 'availability for guided attention (i.