private language

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Wittgenstein's private language argument has had an extraordinary influence, but examination reveals it to be nothing but multilayered confusion.
An exercise for another occasion would be to line up and compare competing readings of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, about what he is trying to do in the book, of the aim and structure of the so-called private language argument, and all the other content of the text, to argue for some interpretations as more faithful to the writings than others.
The author speculates and raises questions designed to show an opponent where he or she has gone astray This is nowhere more true than in the passages of the private language argument, where Wittgenstein argues against the sophist, who believes it is possible, and even unavoidable, to speak a language and live in a world of ones own.
[section]258 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is often seen as the core of his private language argument. While its role is certainly overinflated and it is a mistake to think that there is anything that could be called the private language argument, [section]258 is an important part of the private language sections of the Philosophical Investigations.
There is, for instance, a response to Shoemaker's argument for a constitutive relationship between certain mental states and introspective access to them, and one can find a short reply to the private language argument. Many of the philosophical arguments, however, are rather brief, and they will hardly convince opposing philosophers.
Phenomenal Concepts and the Private Language Argument, DAVID PAPINEAU
Mulhall favours the former (but gives both sides a fair and thorough exposition), and thus maintains a certain resolute continuity between the Tractatus and the private language argument of the Investigations.
He calls this private source of understanding an "intuition," and the main line of argument against intuition in our understanding of a rule draws, appropriately, on what is called his "private language argument." This paper defends a nonverificationist reading of this argument and its use against the realist so construed.
I will not consider Jacquette's third goal here; although he handles the material skillfully, for the most part his analysis of such topics as the private language argument does not cover new ground.
There are, after all, credible dualist replies to the private language argument. Dualism, Berkeleyan idealism, the ontological argument and others, each have extraordinary resilience in the history of our field and each has formidable, skillful, contemporary advocates.
Wittgenstein's elaboration of the ethological dimension to include the social is clearly illustrated by three key elements in his thought: the Private Language Argument; the solution to the problem of reference; and the nature of rules.
Although his sociological orientation inclines him--not without tension--to favor the last of these, unlike many holists he finds Descartes' skepticism both intelligible and answerable (p.124), and the private language argument no more stable or normative than a social contract (p.184).