Raz acknowledges that the fact that grounds promissory reason cannot be an interest or benefit of the promisee
derived from the content of the promise itself, since, as we know, whether the promisee
benefits from the performance of the promised act or not is a contingent matter that does not determine promises' bindingness.
Contract doctrine requires that payment from breaching promisor to disappointed promisee
amount to expectation damages.
that 'the circumstances indicate that the promisee
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.'").
important sense freeriding on the information procured by the promisee
1981) ("The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to perform his promise but compensation of the promisee
for the loss resulting from breach."); Nicolas Cornell, A Complainant-Oriented Approach to Unconscionability and Contract Law, 164 U.
reliance, the promisor must compensate the promisee
Indeed, where a promisor, with full knowledge of all the material circumstances, agrees to accept a lesser sum in payment of a debt, which in turn represents at least a substantial part of the sum originally owing, the promise should be binding unless the promisee
has engaged in economic duress or has otherwise misrepresented his true financial position.
a court to require a promisee
to accept substantial performance.");
contracts--in other words, that courts are sympathetic to promisees
(34) This, they explained, is the sum 'theoretically needed to put the promisee
in the position which would have been achieved if the contract had been performed'.
Satisfaction of the latter requirement may depend on the reasonableness of the promisee
's reliance, on its definite and substantial character in relation to the remedy sought, on the formality with which the promise is made, on the extent to which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and channeling functions of form are met by the commercial setting or otherwise, and on the extent to which such other policies as the enforcement of bargains and the prevention of unjust enrichment are relevant.
The dual performance hypothesis, by contrast, holds that the typical promisor makes a promise in the alternative: to deliver goods or services in return for a price or to make a monetary transfer to the promisee
in place of delivery.