In this section I argue that the Simple Obligation is, in a certain sense, primary--in the process clarifying this central notion of being "prepared" or "ready" to act.
Suppose now, for reductio, that I still satisfy the Simple Obligation, so that I am in fact prepared to do my part, if I become sufficiently sure that others will do theirs.
It might be objected here that there are levels of member organization sufficient to generate intentional collective action but that fall short of the sort of organization that obtains when all have the interlocking intentions required to satisfy the Simple Obligation. To be sure, so the objection goes, some willingness to act if others act seems a prerequisite for participating in intentional collective action.
I want to allow, therefore, that there may be cases in which members of a group satisfy the first clause of the Complex Obligation, but not the second clause (that is, not the Simple Obligation).