state of affairs

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Purism1 you should never choose an option that results in a bad state of affairs, even if all alternative options result in even worse states of affairs.
Perhaps Purism1 can be saved from this objection by using the idea of causation: 'you should never choose an option that causes a bad state of affairs, even if all alternative options result in even worse states of affairs'.
Consider the first feature that causation is a second-order relation that holds between first-order states of affairs. In his (1997), Armstrong argues that states of affairs are the most fundamental ontological structures.
Generally, states of affairs are independent from one another just in case no state of affairs entails either the existence or the non-existence of any distinct state of affairs.
The 'constituents of states of affairs can be sorted into different form-sets' (116) and these form-sets, in turn, into base-sets (188).
Chapter 6 concerns the account of states of affairs defended in the book, its role in generating the account of categories, and the philosophical implications of these accounts.
The terms of the singular causal relation are first-order states of affairs. The relation itself is external--a non-supervenient second-order relation.
The concern is that if it is, then independence (among higher order states of affairs now) will not hold, since a state of affairs (the causal relation) precludes or entails another distinct state of affairs (i.e.
So then, it seems that a great many states of affairs are inconceivable only because they are outside of the range of possible human experience.
The point here is not to raise an objection to the inconceivability thesis--though obviously on this interpretation there are a great many inconceivable but possible states of affairs. But these examples are problematic for the conceivability thesis as well.
The latter solution consists in "reconstructing reality to embrace negativity" by postulating negative states of affairs and perhaps even negative essences.
According to the truthmaker theory that the authors favor, all contingent truths are made true by existing facts or states of affairs. But if that is so, then it appears that we must accept the existence of the negative facts that are required to make negative truths (such as "There is no hippopotamus in the room") true.