Truth

(redirected from Truth Theory)
Also found in: Dictionary, Thesaurus, Encyclopedia.

TRUTH. The actual state of things.
     2. In contracts, the parties are bound to toll the truth in their dealings, and a deviation from it will generally avoid the contract; Newl. on Contr. 352-3; 2 Burr. 1011; 3 Campb. 285; and even concealment, or suppressio veri, will be considered fraudulent in the contract of insurance. 1 Marsh. on Ins. 464; Peake's N. P. C. 115; 3 Campb. 154, 506.
     3. In giving his testimony, a witness is required to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; for the object in the examination of matters of fact, is to ascertain truth.
     4. When a defendant is sued civilly for slander or a libel, he may justify by giving the truth in evidence; but when a criminal prosecution is instituted by the commonwealth for a libel, he cannot generally justify by giving the truth in evidence.
     5. The constitutions of several of the United States have made special provisions in favor of giving the truth in evidence in prosecutions for libels, under particular circumstances. In the constitutions of Pennsylvania, Delaware, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, it is declared, that in publications for libels on men in respect to their public official conduct, the truth may be given in evidence, when the matter published was proper for public information. The constitution of New York declares, that in all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous, is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted. By constitutional provision in Mississippi and Missouri, and by legislative enactment in New Jersey, Arkansas, Tennessee, Act of 1805, c. 6: and Vermont, Rev. Stat. tit. 11, c. 25, s. 68; the right to give the truth in evidence has been more extended; it applies to all prosecutions or indictments for libels, without any qualifications annexed in restraint of the privilege. Cooke on Def. 61.

A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. By John Bouvier. Published 1856.
References in periodicals archive ?
These sorts of 'opaque contexts' present difficulties to any approach suggesting that an extensional truth theory can function as a meaning theory, for the embedded sentences seem to be contributing something more than their truth conditions.
Part I lays out the history of the program of adopting a Tarski-style truth theory as a basis for a compositional meaning theory.
Some of the issues dealt with here are (i) how to describe the project of radical interpretation, (ii) the role of the Tarski-style truth theory, (iii) the Principle of Charity, (iv) the role of the theory of agency, (v) the objective indeterminacy of interpretation theories, (vi) Davidson's unified theory of meaning and action, and finally his infamous claim that "there is no such thing as a language." In Chapter 17, they argue that this latter claim is unexceptionable when what Davidson means by a 'language' is appropriately qualified.
The substitutional quantifier in (ES) takes as instances only sentences that can be expressed in the language in which the truth theory is formulated.
If this is the way that (PMI) is to be interpreted, then the finite deflationary truth theory needs to be supplemented with an infinite theory of implication principles.
All we need do is conceive the truth theory as stated in a language whose sentences are LF-representations, and then stipulate that:
and while (to my knowledge) he does not explicitly repeat this stipulation elsewhere, some such restriction appears to guide his conception of what an adequate truth theory might be.
The axioms of the truth theory capable of dealing with the English indexical "I" will deliver such theorems as: