Veto(redirected from Veto power)
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The refusal of an executive officer to assent to a bill that has been created and approved by the legislature, thereby depriving the bill of any legally binding effect.
Article I, Section 7, of the U.S. Constitution states that "every bill" and "every order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives may be necessary" must be presented to the president for approval. If the president disapproves of the legislation and declines to sign the bill, he issues a veto, returning the bill unsigned to Congress. Similar provisions in state constitutions give governors the same veto power, and municipal charters often give the mayor the right to veto legislation from the city council.
The veto power gives the executive a central role in the legislative process. By threatening a veto before legislation is passed, the executive can force the legislature to compromise and pass amendments it would otherwise find unacceptable. Though there is great power in the veto, most executives use it cautiously, as overuse can antagonize the legislature and create political risk for the executive.
Under the Constitution the president has ten days (not counting Sundays) in which to consider legislation presented for approval. The president has three options: sign the bill, making it law; veto the bill; or take no action on the bill during the ten-day period. A veto can be over-ridden by a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress. If the president takes no action, the bill automatically becomes law after ten days. If Congress adjourns before the ten days have expired and the president has not signed the bill, however, the bill is said to have been subjected to a pocket veto. A pocket veto deprives Congress of the chance to override a formal veto. State governors have similar veto and pocket veto powers, and state legislatures usually are required to override vetoes by a two-thirds majority of both houses.
In the majority of states the governor also has the authority to select particular items from an appropriations bill and veto them individually. This authority, called the line-item veto, is popular because it allows the executive to cancel specific appropriations items from bills that are hundreds of pages long. The legislature can override the veto by a two-thirds majority vote.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Presidents ronald reagan and george h.w. bush called for a constitutional amendment that would provide the president with a line-item veto. After years of debate, Congress rejected the idea of enacting such an amendment and instead approved federal line-item veto authority in a 1996 statute known as the Line-Item Veto Act (2 U.S.C.A. §§ 691–692). The act gave the president the ability to cancel individual tax and spending measures included in federal legislation.
Members of Congress opposed to the act immediately filed a federal lawsuit, arguing that the act was unconstitutional. In Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997), the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the action and dismissed the case. A key point in the ruling was that a plaintiff had to show an actual injury because of the law. The senators and representatives had argued that the constitutional Separation of powers had been violated by the act but the Court found this was not an actual injury. Therefore, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction.
Two groups of plaintiffs then filed suit, arguing that they had been injured. One group included the City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions that represented health care employees. They challenged a line-item veto President bill clinton had made in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. The other group was the Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., which consisted of approximately 30 potato growers located throughout Idaho. The collective opposed President Clinton's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Both groups of plaintiffs argued that the line-item vetoes had deprived them of federal funds. The U.S. district court found that the parties had standing and that the act violated the Presentment Clause under Article I of the Constitution. The Supreme Court eventually resolved the matter in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 141 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1998).
The Court, in a 6–3 vote, agreed that the Line-Item Veto Act, which empowered the president to cancel individual portions of bills, violated the Presentment Clause. Under the Presentment Clause, after a bill has passed both Houses, but "before it become[s] a Law," it must either be approved (signed) or returned (vetoed) by the president. By canceling only parts of the legislation, President Clinton had, in effect, amended the laws. The Court concluded that there was no constitutional authorization for the president to amend legislation at his discretion.
A widely used means of congressional over-sight has been the legislative veto. A legislative veto is a statutory device that subjects proposals and decisions of Executive Branch administrative agencies to additional legislative consideration. The legislature may disapprove agency action by a committee, one-house, or concurrent resolution.
Since it was first used in the 1930s, the legislative veto has been the subject of controversy. The legislative veto circumvents traditional bill-passing procedures in that the legislative action is not presented to the executive for approval. This veto has been defended on the ground that it is not a legislative act. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated legislative veto provisions involving immigration and naturalization on the ground that these provisions violated the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches. Despite Chadha, Congress has not systematically removed legislative veto provisions from federal statutes, and some states continue to use the legislative veto.
Cameron, Charles M. 2000. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Lipson, G. V., ed. 2002. Presidential Vetoes: Challenges and Bibliography. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Novinka.
Mason, Edward Campbell. 1967. The Veto Power: Its Origin, Development, and Function in the Government of the United States, 1789–1889. New York: Russell & Russell.
VETO, legislation. This is a Latin word signifying, I forbid.
2. It is usually applied to the power of the president of the United States to negative a bill which has passed both branches of the legislature. The act of refusing to sign such a bill, and the message which is sent to congress assigning the reasons for a refusal to sign it, are each called a veto.
3. When a bill is engrossed, and has received the sanction of both houses, it is transmitted to the president for his approbation. If he approves of it, he signs it. If he does not, he sends it, with his objections, to the house in which it originated, and that house enter the objections on their journals, and proceed to reconsider the bill. Coast. U. S. art. I, s. 7, cl. 2. Vide Story on the Const. Sec. 878; 1 Kent, Com. 239.
4. The governors of the several states have generally a negative on the acts of the legislature. When exercised with due caution, the veto power is some additional security against inconsiderate and hasty legislation, or where bills have passed through prejudice or want of due reflection. It was, however, mainly intended as a weapon in the hands of the chief magistrate to defend the executive department from encroachment and usurpation, as well as a just balance of the constitution.
5. The veto power of the British sovereign has not been exercised for more than a century. It was exercised once during the, reign of Queen Anne. Edinburgh Rev. 10th vol. 411, &c.; Parke's Lectures, 126. But anciently the king frequently replied Le roy s'avisera, which was in effect withholding his assent. In France the king had the initiative of all laws, but not the veto. See 1 Toull. art. 39; and see Nos. 42, 52, note 3.