Automobile Searches

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Automobile Searches

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees U.S. citizens freedom from "unreasonable searches and seizures." In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court established the principle that a warrant issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate" must be obtained before a government authority may breach the individual privacy that the Fourth Amendment secures. The Katz decision held that "searches that are conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Over the years, the Court has recognized a number of exceptions to this rule that allow the police to conduct a legal search without a warrant in certain situations. One of these exceptions is for automobile searches.

Warrantless Searches

The automobile exception was first announced in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), where the Court held that federal Prohibition agents had been justified in searching, without a warrant, an automobile that they had stopped on a public highway, because the agents had had Probable Cause to believe that it contained contraband. The Court found that the search had been justified by the exigency of the circumstances, noting that, unlike a dwelling, store, or other structure, an automobile can be "quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."

Automobile Searches: Is the Fourth Amendment in Jeopardy?

The right to move about freely without fear of governmental interference is one of the cornerstones of democracy in America. Likewise, freedom from governmental intrusions into personal privacy is a cherished U.S. right. Automobiles have come to symbolize these rights in the United States, but freedom and autonomy often conflict with law enforcement's interest in preserving domestic order.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees U.S. citizens freedom from "unreasonable searches and seizures." The Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), interpreted the Fourth Amendment to mean that a warrant issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate" must be obtained before police officers may lawfully search Personal Property. The Court in Katz held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."

In its struggle to balance the Fourth Amendment's personal privacy guarantees with the government's interest in effective law enforcement, the Court has allowed numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement, prompting debate over the amendment's continued viability. A particularly tricky area involves decisions regarding warrantless automobile searches.

Beginning with its decision in Carrollv. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), the Court has granted law enforcement personnel substantial latitude when searching automobiles and their contents. Carroll and its progeny established that automobiles constitute a distinct class of personal property that deserves less privacy protection than other types of property. The Court has consistently held that because a car and its contents are easily and quickly moved, police officers need not obtain a warrant to search them if they reasonably believe that doing so would result in lost evidence.

Since its decision in Carroll, the Supreme Court has articulated several rationales for allowing warrantless vehicle searches. First, the Court followed Carroll and held that a warrantless search of an automobile is valid because of the exigent circumstances involved (see, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 [1970]). Next, the Court found that warrantless automobile searches are justified because individuals have a lower expectation of privacy in their automobiles than in their homes (see, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417U.S. 583, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325[1974] [plurality opinion]). Finally, the Court extended the warrant exception to containers found inside a vehicle, reasoning that if the police could legally search an automobile, they could also legally search containers found in the automobile (see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572[1982]). However, the Court had previously ruled that where a vehicle search was illegal, a subsequent search of a suitcase found inside the trunk of the vehicle was also illegal (Arkansas v. Sanders, 442U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235[1979]). The need to distinguish between a Sanders situation and a Ross situation caused some confusion, both for the police and for the courts. This need was finally addressed by the Court in 1991.

Underlying all the exceptions to the warrant requirement is the need to assist law enforcement personnel without unduly trampling on the Constitution. However, some have argued that the pendulum has swung too far in favor of Police Power. In 1991, the Court extended the permissible scope of the warrant exception with its decision in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619, which upheld the warrantless search of a bag found inside the defendant's vehicle. In an attempt to clarify the law regarding warrantless searches of containers found in automobiles, the justices announced that the Fourth Amendment does not require a distinction between Probable Cause to search an entire vehicle, including containers found inside (as in Ross), and probable cause to search only a container found inside an automobile (as in Sanders). The Court announced a new and succinct rule regarding automobile searches:"The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained."

The Acevedo decision provides what is known as a bright-line rule, that is, a Rule of Law that is clear and unequivocal. But bright-line rules can obscure the important nuances that surround an issue. The Acevedo decision left little doubt in the minds of law enforcement personnel that they could, with probable cause, search not only an automobile but also any containers found inside. But that clarity and the unfettered discretion it gives the police trouble some legal analysts. They assert that the ruling effectively guts the Fourth Amendment as it applies to automobile searches and, perhaps more disturbing, that its reasoning could and probably will be applied to searches of other types of personal property.

Justice John Paul Stevens noted in his dissent to Acevedo that the majority's ruling creates the paradoxical situation in which a container, such as a briefcase, is not subject to a warrantless search when it is carried in full view on a public street but becomes subject to such a search upon being placed inside an automobile.

Critics of Acevedo also argue that it contradicts earlier rationales established to support exceptions to the warrant requirement. In Acevedo, the Court found no exigent circumstances to justify the search, as it had in Carroll, since the police could have legally seized the bag and obtained a warrant for a later search. Neither, assert critics, would the defendant's expectation of privacy in the bag be diminished by virtue of his placing it into the automobile.

Lacking both exigency and the lesser expectation of privacy justifications, the Court turned to policy considerations to support its decision in Acevedo. The majority stated that law enforcement personnel were unnecessarily impeded by the Court's previous rulings on this issue. The Court dismissed privacy concerns by stating that protection of privacy is minimal anyway, since in many automobile search cases the police may legally search a container under the "search-incidentto-arrest" justification. Critics respond that the policy underlying that exception is that the police should be able to secure the arrest site in order to protect their safety; it does not follow that the police should be allowed to search containers even when they are not in danger.

Critics assert that by giving the police the discretion to determine what is a reasonable search, the Court ignored established precedent governing Fourth Amendment cases. Justice robert h. jackson wrote in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948),

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which is often not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.

According to Justice Stevens, the majority in Acevedo rejected this precedent without justification.

Justice Antonin Scalia took a different approach. He suggested in his concurrence to Acevedo that the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe warrantless searches but rather prohibits unreasonable searches. Scalia argued that "the supposed 'general rule' that a warrant is always required does not appear to have any basis in the common law."

Lower federal courts and state courts of appeals have struggled with the question of whether Acevedo effectively expands law enforcement officers' ability to search automobiles without a warrant. For example, in United States v. Brooks, 838 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York upheld the conviction of an individual for distribution and conspiracy to distribute cocaine after officers conducted a warrantless search of the defendant's automobile. The officer, an undercover police agent, knew that a package contained cocaine, and the agent and other officers observed the defendant place the package in the front seat of the car. Noting Scalia's concurrence, the Court distinguished between a warrantless search and an unreasonable search. Because the officer knew that the package contained cocaine, the search of the automobile for the package was reasonable.

Some state courts have invalidated warrantless searches notwithstanding the Acevedo decision, though even these courts have struggled with the application of the decision. In Green v. Indiana, 647 N.E.2d 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), officers conducted surveillance of the defendant at his home in Indiana based upon reliable tips. The officers knew that the defendant and another individual planned to deliver cocaine from Texas to Indiana after making a trip to Texas. The officers anticipated that the defendant would return in two days and reestablished surveillance at a state highway in Indiana. The officers did not obtain a Search Warrant for the automobile, though they had discussed the idea. The officers stopped Green's car upon his return, arrested him, and conducted a warrantless search of his automobile. The officers discovered the cocaine during their search. The court held that though the officers had probable cause to conduct the search, it was not impracticable to secure a warrant, relying in part on the Acevedo decision, the court held that though the officer had probable cause to conduct the search, it would not have been impracticable for them to secure a warrant, thus their failure to do so rendered the search illegal.

Further readings

Dressler, Joshua. 2002. Understanding Criminal Procedure. Newark, N.J.: LexisNexis.

Gottlieb, Henry. 2002. "N.J. Joins Minority of States that Ban Freewheeling Consent Searches; Justices Invoke 'Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion' Standard." New Jersey Law Journal 167 (March 18).

Saltzburg, Stephen A., et al. 2003. Basic Criminal Procedure. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group.


Privacy; Search and Seizure; Search Warrant.

After the Carroll decision, the Court embarked on a long, and often confusing, line of decisions that interpreted the automobile exception as it applied not only to automobiles but also to containers found in automobiles; to mobile homes; and to sobriety checkpoints. For several decades, the Court rarely cited Carroll in vehicle-search cases. Instead, it relied on the "search incident to arrest" doctrine, which allowed the police to search, without a warrant, the areas surrounding an arrest site. Originally, the police could search areas that were outside the control of the arrested person. (See, e.g., Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 [8th Cir. 1966], cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 [1967], in which the Court let stand a ruling by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that the search of a car parked in a driveway, while the suspect was arrested at the front door of his house, was valid). However, the Court restricted the "search incident to arrest" standard in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969), which held that a warrantless search must be limited to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee.

After the Chimel decision, the Court abandoned this line of reasoning and returned to the "probable cause accompanied by exigent circumstances" rationale in Carroll. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970), the justices found that Carroll supported a warrantless search of an impounded car. They based this finding on the theory that had the search been conducted at the time of the arrest, it would have been valid because of the exigent circumstances that existed at that time. The fact that the car was impounded, and there fore immobile, by the time the search was conducted did not affect the Court's decision. A year later, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971) (plurality opinion), the Court held that a search conducted with a warrant that was later found to be invalid fell outside of the automobile exception. The Court stated that the police in Coolidge could not have legally conducted a warrantless search at the arrest scene because no exigent circumstances existed: At the time of arrest, the arrestee had not had access to the car and therefore could not have moved it. The Coolidge decision firmly established that the police must show both probable cause and exigent circumstances in order for a warrantless search to be valid.

The Court then added an alternative rationale to support automobile searches, with its decision in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1974) (plurality opinion). In Cardwell, the police had made an impression of the tires of the suspect's car and had taken paint samples from the car, without a warrant. The Court held that the search had been permissible because the police had had probable cause and the search had been conducted in a reasonable manner. No exigency had existed in this case, but the Court found justification in the principle that individuals have a "lower expectation of privacy" in their automobiles. Writing for the plurality, Justice harry a. blackmun stated, "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects."

The same rationale supported the Court's determination that police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they search a passenger's personal belongings inside an automobile that they have probable cause to believe contains contraband. Officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers' belongings that are capable of concealing the object of the search. If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, including every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search, then this rule extends to passengers' property as well, the Supreme Court wrote in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (U.S. 1999). The Balancing of the relative interests weighs in favor of allowing searches of a passenger's belongings, because passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they transport in cars.

This "lesser expectation of privacy" rationale was not sufficient to support a warrantless search in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977). In Chadwick, the defendants were arrested immediately after they had placed a footlocker in their trunk. Federal agents, who had probable cause to believe that the footlocker contained marijuana, impounded the car and opened the footlocker without a warrant. The Court found that although the agents did have probable cause to search the footlocker, they had not proved that they had probable cause to search the car in order to find the footlocker. Since the car was impounded, no exigent circumstances existed. Furthermore, the Court held that the defendants had a greater expectation of privacy in the closed footlocker than in an automobile, which is open to public view. "The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to the (defendants') footlocker,"the Court concluded. Therefore, the "lesser expectation of privacy" rationale did not support an extension of the automobile exception to the closed footlocker.

Armed with the Carroll-Chambers line of cases (the "probable cause accompanied by exigent circumstances" rationale) and the Chadwick decision (the "lower expectation of privacy" rationale), the Court tackled the question of whether a warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi fell under either justification. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979), the police had probable cause to believe that a suitcase picked up by the defendant at an airport contained contraband. After the defendant placed the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi and left the airport, the police stopped the taxi, opened the trunk, and searched the suitcase, which contained the contraband that they expected to find. The Court evaluated the facts under each rationale and found that (a) once the taxi had been stopped, no exigency existed; and, (b) an individual's privacy expectations in a suitcase, which "serve[s] as a repository for personal items," are greater than his or her privacy expectations in an automobile. For these reasons, the Court held that the search had violated the Fourth Amendment.

Later cases, however, extended the automobile exception to containers located in an automobile, where authorities have probable cause to search the automobile. For example, in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982), the police stopped a car that they had probable cause to believe contained contraband. Without a warrant, they opened a closed paper bag that they found inside the car's trunk, and discovered heroin. The Court held that the search was valid, reasoning that if the police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, they also had justification to search the bag.

However, the Court retreated from this holding in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (U.S. 1998), where it held that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred when a police officer had conducted a full search of a car, including the trunk, after the driver had been stopped for speeding. The officer had issued the driver a citation, rather than arresting him, although Iowa law would have permitted an arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the search could not be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant requirement, as the underlying rationales for the exception, including the need to disarm the suspect and to preserve evidence, did not justify the search of the car's trunk. While the concern for officer safety in the context of a routine traffic stop might justify the minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, the Court said, it does not, by itself, justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full field-type search.

The automobile exception was also extended to searches of some mobile homes, in Californiav. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985). In Carney, the police had searched a motor home that was parked in a public lot. The Court found the search to be valid, stating that the mobile home was being used for transportation and that it therefore was as readily movable as an automobile. In addition, the Court noted a reduced expectation of privacy in a mobile home, as contrasted with an ordinary residence, as mobile homes, like cars, are regulated by the state. In this case, where the mobile home was parked in a public parking lot, rather than a mobile home park, and was not anchored in any way, it resembled a vehicle more than a residence. Therefore, the automobile exception applied. Carney established not only that the automobile exception applies to some mobile homes but also that it applies to parked vehicles.

Another extension of the automobile exception, called the inventory exception, was recognized by the Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976). Donald Opperman's illegally parked vehicle was ticketed and towed to an impound lot, where the police inventoried its contents. In an unlocked glove compartment, they found marijuana. The Court held that once a vehicle has been legally impounded, its contents may be inventoried. Three justifications were given: protection of the owner's property while it is in police custody; protection of the police against claims; and protection of the police against danger. Likewise, in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987), the Court found that marijuana discovered in a closed backpack during an inventory of an impounded vehicle had been legally seized because there was no showing that "the police, who had followed standardized procedures, had acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." The Court concluded that "reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in Good Faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment."

This patchwork of decisions led many, including Justice lewis f. powell jr., to conclude that "the law of Search and Seizure with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing" (Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744 [1981] [Powell, J., concurring]). The Court attempted to put the confusion to rest with its decision in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991). In Acevedo, federal drug agents tracked a bag that they knew contained marijuana, as it was in transit to the defendant. They then notified police officers, who watched as the defendant put the bag into the trunk of a car and drove away. The police officers stopped the car, opened the trunk, and searched the bag, finding the marijuana. The Court held that the search was legal, stating that it is not necessary for an officer to obtain a warrant before searching a container located in an automobile when the officer has probable cause to believe that the container holds contraband or evidence. After analyzing the long and ambiguous line of automobile exception cases, the Court decided that the distinction between the Ross situation (where the police had probable cause to search the car) and the Sanders situation (where the police had probable cause only to search the container) was not supported by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Discarding the reasoning in Sanders as unworkable and an unjustified impingement on legitimate police activity, the justices announced a new and unequivocal rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained."

The Acevedo decision was met with harsh criticism by some legal analysts, who saw it as an excessive retreat from Fourth Amendment guarantees. Supporters, however, pointed out that the police still must establish that they have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search before such a search will be found valid. Probable cause can be shown in a variety of ways, but generally it follows from a chain of events that raise police suspicions from the level of mere conjecture to the level of reasonable grounds. For example, in Acevedo, federal drug enforcement agents had previously seized and inspected the package that was eventually delivered to the defendant, and they knew that it contained marijuana. In Sanders, a reliable informant had told the police that the defendant would arrive at the airport carrying a green suitcase containing marijuana. And in Ross, an informant had told the police that someone known as Bandit was selling drugs from the trunk of his car; when the police located the car described by the informant, they discovered through a computer check that the driver, the defendant, Albert Ross Jr., used the alias Bandit. From these cases, the Court has shown that Arbitrary searches or searches based on mere suspicion will not be supported by a spurious claim of probable cause.

Warrantless Seizures of Automobile as Forfeitable Contraband

The Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband. The U.S. Supreme Court thus reversed a decision in which the Supreme Court of Florida had held that the warrantless seizure of an automobile, pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, violated the Fourth Amendment in the absence of exigent circumstances. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 143 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1999).

The case involved a defendant who had been convicted of possession of cocaine, which had been found during a police inventory search of his automobile following its warrantless seizure from a public parking lot pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. Fla. Stat.932.701. Although the police lacked probable cause to believe that the defendant's car contained contraband, they did have probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under the Florida law.

Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence recognizes the need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away, and this need is equally weighty when the automobile, as distinguished from its contents, is the very contraband that the police seek to secure, the Court observed. In addition to the special considerations recognized in the context of movable items, the Court continued, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently afforded law enforcement officials greater latitude in exercising their duties in public places. Because the police had seized defendant's vehicle from a public area, the Court concluded that the warrantless seizure had not involved any invasion of the defendant's privacy.

Sobriety Checkpoints

During the 1980s and 1990s, the Court dealt with a new line of cases in which the automobile exception has been used to justify sobriety-checkpoint programs. Under such programs, police stop motorists, typically along an interstate highway, for the purpose of apprehending drivers who are impaired by alcohol. One such program was challenged and found to be constitutional in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990). The Court applied a somewhat more stringent test than that used in automobile search cases, citing as relevant authority a line of cases involving highway checkpoints for discovering illegal Aliens (see, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 [1976]; Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 [1979]). Brown required "a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." Applying that balancing test, the majority in Sitz found that the intrusion on individual liberty imposed by Michigan's sobriety checkpoint program was outweighed by the advancement of the state's interest in preventing drunk driving. Therefore, it concluded that the program did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Similar sobriety-checkpoint programs have been used in other states. Since the Sitz decision, all have passed constitutional muster. Less certain is the constitutionality of narcotics checkpoints. In 1992, Minnesota instituted a random narcotics checkpoint on an interstate highway's exit ramp. The police stopped every third or fourth car and asked several questions of the occupants. If the answers or demeanor of the occupants aroused suspicion, the car was diverted for further investigation. A number of individuals were cited when police found marijuana, either in plain view or after a consensual search of the vehicle.

The Minnesota scheme raises serious constitutional questions. The state has a legitimate interest in curbing the use of illegal drugs. However, it is not clear that a narcotics-checkpoint program is a valid means of promoting this interest, in light of the privacy interest violated by random questioning for investigation of drug possession or use. Similarly, it is unclear whether the Minnesota scheme is the type of minimal intrusion that the Court sanctioned in Sitz. Still, the Sitz and Acevedo decisions, both of which have been criticized as giving too much discretion to the police, indicate that the Court intends to allow a great deal of latitude to law enforcement officials in stopping and searching automobiles under most conditions.

Further readings

Blade, Bryan S. 1991. "Fourth Amendment—The Constitutionality of a Sobriety Checkpoint Program." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 81 (winter).

Braeske, Chris. 1993. "The Drug War Comes to a Highway Near You: Police Power to Effectuate Highway 'Narcotics Checkpoints' under the Federal and State Constitutions." Law and Inequality 11 (June).

Fisanick, Christian A. 2002. Vehicle Search Law Deskbook. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West.

Grant, Marguerite T., ed. 2003. Motor Vehicle Stops: Update on the Law Governing Police Searches and Roadside Questioning. Boston, Mass.: Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education.

King, Lawrence T. 1988. "The Inventory Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement: Why the Last in Should Be the First Out—or, Putting Opperman and Bertine in Their Place." American Journal of Trial Advocacy 12 (fall).

Kole, Edward T. 1987. "Parked Motor Home Held to Be within Scope of Automobile Exception to Warrant Requirement—California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)." Seton Hall Law Review 17 (summer).

Lally, Nicole C. 2000. "Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: Valid Automobile Search Includes a Passenger's Belongings." Tennessee Law Review 67 (winter): 455–73.

Logan, Wayne A. 2002. "Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche." Indiana Law Journal 77 (summer): 419–67.

Soden, Steven D. 1992. "Expansion of the 'Automobile Exception' to the Warrant Requirement: Police Discretion Replaces the 'Neutral and Detached Magistrate.'" Missouri Law Review 57 (spring).


Privacy; Drugs and Narcotics; Fourth Amendment; Probable Cause; Search and Seizure; Search Warrant.

West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
References in periodicals archive ?
Labron held that a car's mobility is by itself a sufficient exigency to permit a warrantless search or seizure.(65) Labron is quite similar to earlier cases relying on inherent mobility to rationalize warrantless searches and seizures.
It all started on a lonely road in rural Michigan in 1921 when federal prohibition agents stopped a car of suspected bootleggers, searched it, and discovered liquor hidden behind the upholstery.(4) The Supreme Court approved the warrantless search of the car based on probable cause, reasoning that it was "not practicable" to obtain a warrant because the vehicle could be "quickly moved"(5) Over the years, the Court has abandoned vehicle mobility as a prerequisite for warrantless searches, saying people have "lower expectations of privacy" in cars than they do in "structures."(6)
Under the federally recognized automobile exception to the constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures, if an automobile is to be searched, the inherent mobility of the automobile creates exigent circumstances--a bright-line exception that permits a warrantless search of a lawfully stopped automobile.(48)
For police, who may decide to use looser exclusionary laws as "permission to conduct warrantless searches in situations where the Supreme Court said they could not," says Goldwasser, "this is like they died and went to heaven." Doing away with the exclusionary rule, Rudovsky said, means "doing away with the Fourth Amendment."
Rulings similar to the one against Caycedo-Ortiz have reappeared in various instances throughout the federal system, as judges have allowed warrantless searches of a house for sale, rented storage units, mobile homes, train roomettes, trash bags, and even film brought by a photographer to a store for developing.
On appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, the convictions were reversed on the grounds that various pieces of physical evidence and testimony based on personal observation and warrantless searches were unconstitutional and therefore inadmissible.
As another suit, filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights, details, the government's tactics also included break-ins and warrantless searches in several states in an obvious attempt to cripple the movement, not simply to capture aliens (see Alfie Kohn's article on page 74).
"[B]alancing the interests of law enforcement with the rights of people to be protected from warrantless searches in the home, we conclude that art.
Closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage released by Erobas to the media showed the police officers entering the gate using a bolt cutter, which, to the Department of Justice prosecutors who indicted them, "intruded into the privacy of the complainant and the security of her property" and "exceeded the allowable limits of warrantless searches." "Witness believes that the accused police officers were only doing their job because of a legitimate police operation Oplan Galugad," the judge's order read.
Warrantlesssearches In this case, the Court concludes that Code 19.2-54 does not impose any bar to the admissibility of the fruits of warrantless searches. The statute addresses the possible invalidity of a search made under a warrant as a consequence of the magistrates failure to file the warrant with the clerk of the circuit court.
Martial law allowed warrantless arrests in Mindanao in connection with the terror attack on Marawi City but not warrantless searches which a lawyers' group said were being conducted by soldiers in the hunt for members of a homegrown terror group, according to an opposition lawmaker.