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Against a purely delineative approach to citizenship, Kant's associative account of the necessity of the mutual negotiation of political belonging provides glimpses of an alternative approach to the question of citizenship that reverses the delineative formulation.
But for the time being, citizenship is here to stay, and while its centrality is not necessarily to be bemoaned, it does demand a final attempt to reckon with why its delineative and associative dimensions have such trouble getting along.
One way of locating that tension with resonances in Kant might be that the delineative and the associative tend towards opposite directions on the question of inclusivity/exclusivity.
Say that to define the citizenry, we take as a starting point a refashioning of the Kantian associative and delineative principles that anyone who is able to be coerced by the law must have formally equal access to the law (and therefore should have the rights of a citizen), and that citizenship is eligibility for suffrage.
Kant's citizenship troubles point to something a little deeper, and the critique that I suggested his associative approach to membership levels at the delineative iteration of the citizen already provides the first clues.
One need not accede to either Kant's views of human nature or his account of mastery as the basis of rule to see what tension this creates be tween the associative and the delineative approaches to political membership.
The delineative model, as should be clear, attempts to stabilize the analytic connection between the rights to be borne and the political conditions of being a rights bearer, that is to say the responsibilities and requirements of being a holder of rights, leaving the contestation of who meets the criteria of citizenship to the social sphere.