disposition to believe

See: credulity
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References in classic literature ?
It was even the worse for her at this pass, that in her mind - implanted there before her eminently practical father began to form it - a struggling disposition to believe in a wider and nobler humanity than she had ever heard of, constantly strove with doubts and resentments.
There is in all of us a strong disposition to believe that anything lawful is also legitimate.
Since we are supposing that there is nothing more to God's disposition to believe that p than the power to form the right occurrent belief about p, coupled with the fact that p is true, the content of God's belief in this case (unlike the memory case) is determined, not by anything that is already in place at t, but solely by what happens later.
1] a disposition to believe that Jones will mow his lawn at [t.
Whether (F4) constitutes the disposition to believe that Jones will mow his lawn at [t.
But this is not enough: while it is plausible to regard the conjunction of (F4) and (F5) as entailing a disposition to believe that Jones will mow at [t.
Furthermore (though Goldman does not explicitly say this), if an inner representation of p is to be at all relevant to the dispositional belief that p, it must play a role in the exercise of the disposition to believe that p; in particular, a disposition to believe rises to the level of a (dispositional) belief only if it operates by "activating" or "accessing" an inner representation.
This analysis comprises two conditions, the first of which is simply our earlier working definition of dispositional belief, now regarded more properly as a generic schema for any disposition to believe.
This schematic formulation leaves C unspecified (clearly not all circumstances for which the counterfactual is true warrant ascribing to x a disposition to believe, let alone a dispositional belief, that p); but the right specification of C is a complex question that we can afford to leave open, since the only circumstance appealed to in this paper is x's considering at t whether p, which is an acceptable substitute for C if anything is.
In so labeling this condition, I mean to underscore its function in distinguishing cases where exercising a disposition to believe that p involves accessing an internal representation of p (e.
The most it entitles us to attribute to God is the disposition to believe that Jones will mow his lawn at [t.
Presumably nothing but the fact that the activation of this state plays a key role in the exercise of the disposition to believe that p.