disposition to believe

See: credulity
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References in classic literature ?
It was even the worse for her at this pass, that in her mind - implanted there before her eminently practical father began to form it - a struggling disposition to believe in a wider and nobler humanity than she had ever heard of, constantly strove with doubts and resentments.
Duterte talked about promoting civic responsibility and patriotism through the ROTC-wonderful and wonderfully fuzzy objectives-he seemed more concerned that the youth learn two things he admired about the military: their ability to handle guns, and what he assumed as their unquestioning disposition to believe that all orders from superiors are legitimate.
"Among Palestinians," he writes in the book's most daring passage, "there may well be a more fundamental underlying cultural or religious disposition to believe in the reality of death so strongly as to view life as being on a par with death, or even of far less value."
"There is in all of us a strong disposition to believe that anything lawful is also legitimate.
So seemings carry with them, not only a disposition to believe their content, but also a disposition to form second order beliefs about them.
Since we are supposing that there is nothing more to God's disposition to believe that p than the power to form the right occurrent belief about p, coupled with the fact that p is true, the content of God's belief in this case (unlike the memory case) is determined, not by anything that is already in place at t, but solely by what happens later.
(F3) God possesses at [t.sub.1] a disposition to believe that Jones will mow his lawn at [t.sub.3].
Whether (F4) constitutes the disposition to believe that Jones will mow his lawn at [t.sub.3] or the disposition to believe that Jones will not mow his lawn at [t.sub.3] depends on (F5), and (F5) is a soft fact (soft all the way through) relative to [t.sub.2].
But this is not enough: while it is plausible to regard the conjunction of (F4) and (F5) as entailing a disposition to believe that Jones will mow at [t.sub.3], nothing about (F4) and/or (F5) makes it at all plausible to regard this disposition as a dispositional belief that Jones will mow at [t.sub.3].(20) Yet it is critical to DOS's evasion of theological fatalism that God's disposition to believe that Jones will mow his lawn at [t.sub.3] amount to nothing more than the conjunction of (F4) and (F5).
In holding that "p is somehow lodged in the mind," Goldman presumably is not requiring that p itself is in the mind; it is surely sufficient (no more than this would even be intelligible) that p is virtually in the mind, in the form of a "representation." Furthermore (though Goldman does not explicitly say this), if an inner representation of p is to be at all relevant to the dispositional belief that p, it must play a role in the exercise of the disposition to believe that p; in particular, a disposition to believe rises to the level of a (dispositional) belief only if it operates by "activating" or "accessing" an inner representation.
This is enough to suggest a revised analysis of "x has at t a dispositional belief that p." This analysis comprises two conditions, the first of which is simply our earlier working definition of dispositional belief, now regarded more properly as a generic schema for any disposition to believe. Since this condition sets forth x's counterfactual access to p, I shall call it
This schematic formulation leaves C unspecified (clearly not all circumstances for which the counterfactual is true warrant ascribing to x a disposition to believe, let alone a dispositional belief, that p); but the right specification of C is a complex question that we can afford to leave open, since the only circumstance appealed to in this paper is x's considering at t whether p, which is an acceptable substitute for C if anything is.