Schematically, when moral property P depends for its instantiation in a given context on constitutive criteria A, B, and C, and A, B, and C are ordinally rankable one against the other, then indeterminacies can arise if the verdict of the highest-ranked dimension is different from that given by a plurality of lower-ranked bases.
If my accounts of the means by which vagueness can be generated are appealing and plausible, then, presumptively, alethic indeterminacies sometimes arise in the moral realm.
where p,r,s are integers [greater than or equal to] 1 and max{p, r, s) [greater than or equal to] 2, meaning that at least one of p,r,s is [greater than or equal to] 2; and [t.sub.j] represents types of numeral truths, ik represents types of numeral indeterminacies, and represents types of numeral falsehoods, for j = 1, 2, ..., p; k = 1, 2, ..., r; l = 1, 2, ..., s.
where p, r, s are integers [greater than or equal to]1 too, and max{p, r, s] [greater than or equal to]2, meaning that at least one of p,r,s is [greater than or equal to]2; and similarly [T.sub.j] represent types of literal truths, [I.sub.k] represent types of literal indeterminacies, and [F.sub.i] represent types of literal falsehoods, for j = 1, 2, ..., p; k = 1, 2, ..., r; l = 1, 2, ..., s.
In 2015 Smarandache refined the literal indeterminacy I into different types of literal
indeterminacies (depending on the problem to solve) such as [I.sub.1], [I.sub.2], ..., [I.sub.p] with integer p [greater than or equal to] 1, and obtained the refined neutrosophic numbers of the form [N.sub.p] = a+[b.sub.1][I.sub.1] + [b.sub.2][I.sub.2] + ...
