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treat cooperators and noncooperators at sentencing and therefore
(22.) See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 13-14 (1984) (analyzing the development of cooperation among "tit-for-tat" players of a Prisoners' Dilemma game, who begin with a cooperative move and thereafter reciprocate the move of the opposite player, including refusal to cooperate further with noncooperators).
More generally, the likelihood of cooperation increases when the prevailing culture provides strong reinforcement: noncooperators are simply frozen out.
Several leading commentators accordingly hypothesize that rational regime designers are more likely to adopt a restrictive membership rule under conditions of uncertainty about state preferences: "Membership enables states to learn about each others' preferences if the membership mechanism can distinguish cooperators from noncooperators....
See infra text accompanying notes 192-95 (discussing the evolutionary problem of excluding noncooperators from a cooperative group).
The first-order condition for noncooperators yields the following reaction function:
If the majority decision goes against them, people who want to cooperate are not bound to do so as a consequence of having revealed their preferences in a vote; they are not risking exploitation by someone expecting cooperators to pay and noncooperators to get benefits without paying.
As memorably chronicled by the late Frank Donner, by 1973 Nixon's Justice Department had launched more than a hundred anti-radical grand jury proceedings in thirty-six states and had subpoenaed as many as 2,000 witnesses, jailing noncooperators in Camden, New Haven, Boston and elsewhere.
This is possible when players achieve self-enforcing equilibria by committing themselves to punish noncooperators sufficiently to deter noncooperation.
If, on the other hand, there were fundamental differences in the findings from the two samples, we would have to do further research to learn what would appeal to the noncooperators.
They begin with a model of a "social contract," showing that cooperation is viable only if group members combine to punish noncooperators and anyone else who does not join in punishing these noncooperators.
When monitoring and enforcing compliance with quasi-contractual commitments to property rights serves a large class of (or even all) investors, there may be collective action problems associated with the provision of this public good.(15) Because the public good would benefit a large group of actors, actors have an incentive to cooperate to help provide it; cooperation is hindered by the fact that noncooperators cannot be excluded from benefiting from the provision of the public good.(16)