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Key words: Kant, skepticism, refutation/dismissal, fourth paralogism
Such a Transcendental Paralytic underlies much of Kant's discussion of the Paralogisms. Insofar as the Paralogism exceeds reason by conflating two distinct senses of the name "I," the Critique deflates the "I" by paralyzing it.
In the Criticism of the third paralogism of transcendental psychology of the first Critique Kant accepts the irrefutability of the Heraclitean notion of universal becoming or the transitory nature of all things, admitting the impossibility of positing a totally persistent and self-conscious subject: "Even if the saying of some ancient schools, that everything is transitory and nothing in the world is persisting and abiding, cannot hold as soon as one assumes substances, it is still not refuted through the unity of self-consciousness.
The Second Paralogism, which is 'no sophistical play', Kant admits, 'but an inference which appears to withstand even the keenest scrutiny' (Kant, CPR, A351), asserts 'that if a multiplicity of representations are to form a single representation, they must be contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject' (Kant, CPR, A352).
As for the critical period, Kant responds to it only in the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition of the Critique and in the Refutation of Idealism of the second edition.
Kant's reasons for rejecting a collection in favor of a common subject are clear from his general teleological approach and from a particular line of argument in the Paralogisms. In the Second Paralogism, he considered the representation of a single verse, and not of all of cognition, but the point is the same.
In fact, in 'The Paralogism of Pure Reason', 'The Antinomy of Pure Reason', and the 'Ideal of Pure Reason', Kant cast many doubts on the epistemological value of pure reason.
Although they build on results of previous chapters, each can also usefully be read in isolation, as they each contain a history of German rational psychology with respect to the topic of the relevant Paralogism and then an interpretation of that Paralogism in light of that history.
Here, Kant's rejection of knowledge about a Cartesian soul-substance in the First Paralogism is particularly engaging, as is the discussion of the antinomies.
This is explicitly ruled out by the First Paralogism. (5) Kant requires of any and every knowledge claim that it have empirical content.
For its part, the third chapter deals with the anti-skeptical argument contained in the first edition of the Critique, namely, the Fourth Paralogism, whose formulation was made possible by the introduction of the aforementioned modification.
A defense of the fourth paralogism starts with a close analysis of Kant's treatment of human embodiment.