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He defines the former as [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] or the preservation of phantasiai; he defines the latter as [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]; or the application of phantasia.
The distinction between these two trinities is crucial to Augustine's understanding of the terms phantasia and phantasma.
More problematic is its interpretative framework, which opposes images of nature to images of fantasy, science to art, mimesis to phantasia.
Images, Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle, KRISANNA M.
The companions find a cave containing a marvelous machine that is a working model of the universe (canto 12); Leonardus is killed by two bears on order of the sorceress Muselina (16); a dragon turns into a beautiful woman holding a book (20); tricks are played with stones of invisibility, and Cingar's nose grows to an incredible length (21); the companions float through the air to the house of Phantasia, which is held up by crickets (25).
EVAN ROBERT KEELING, "Aristotle on Perception, Phantasia, and Skepticism.
a pain or disturbance due to imagining some destructive or painful evil in the future" (15) with the philosophical characterization of the relation between phantasia and desire: "To the thinking soul images serve as if they were the contents of perception; and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad, it avoids or pursues them.
With images and appearances there arises imagination, and it is this that permits Lorenz to construct a conceptual bridge to Aristotle, by way of phantasia.
Norman Kretzmann describes them as "cognitive likenesses of particular external things reinstated in physical configurations of the organ of phantasia [that is, the brain]" (The Metaphysics of Creation, 355; see 350-64).
Chapter 7: In De Anima and Parva Naturalia, meaning requires phantasia (imagination), the ability to use sensory contents to represent objects, but phantasia alone is insufficient to explain reference.
Part 1, "Ancient Theories," contains six essays: Victor Caston writes on Augustine and the Greeks on intentionality, Richard Sorabji on sensory processes and intentionality in Aristotle (his essay is a reply to Myles Burneat in an ongoing debate about the physiology of perception), Christof Rapp discusses intentionality and phantasia in Aristotle, Hermann Weidemann asks whether Aristotle was a representationalist, Richard Sorabji (again) shows why the Neoplatonists did not have intentional objects of intellection, and Dominic O'Meara surveys intentional objects in later Neoplatonism.
Despite the overall excellence and accuracy of the translation, several key terms--including dogma (and related expressions), pathos, and phantasia (which I shall not discuss)--are rendered in ways which, perhaps not surprisingly, fit best with the philosophical interpretation favored by Annas and Barnes but which also occlude alternative interpretations.