Some independent characterization of evidence is needed, one that would explain why we should believe that one's evidence supervenes
upon one's mental states and depends upon nothing further ('Mentalism') and the further claim that one's ultimate evidence consists of experiences ('Experientialism').
No, says Merricks, because it is incredible that whether the atoms-minus compose a conscious being supervenes
on whether those atoms are located next to atoms arranged left-index-fingerwise.
being conscious not only supervenes
on microphysical doings,
But if sortal properties supervene
on microphysical properties and relations, then it seems that anything having the same microphysical structure as Socrates must be a human being as well.
Other cases, for Instance those in which the chances are identified with counterfactual relative frequencies of one or another sort, will suffer the same fate so long as the truth values of the counterfactuals describing those relative frequencies themselves supervene
on w's history.
The Humean severely limits the range of permissible tools which can be brought to bear on the metaphysical problem of chances: chances must supervene
entirely on local matters of particular fact.
By contrast, Richard Swinburne maintains that telling the history of the world requires us to include mental events, which are neither identical to nor supervene
on physical events.
This definition, which makes use of a claim about the intrinsic features of parts in its definiens, is circular.(3) More importantly for our purposes, if "depends on" means "supervenes
on", this definition renders the first thesis of MS trivial, making it amount to no more than the vacuous claim that an object's properties that supervene
on its atoms (because they supervene
on its parts), supervene
on its atoms.
Belot identifies three attractive features in an account of geometrical possibility: An account is grounded if it implies that geometric possibility supervenes
on the actual material configuration; it is ambitious if it recognizes all the qualitatively distinct possibilities substantivalism does (for example, it recognizes many worlds containing only a single motionless particle, differing on the structure of the surrounding empty space); it is metric if it says that the geometrical features of material objects are exhausted by their distance relations.
Does that mean morally aesthetic properties supervene
on a base of supervenient properties?
One way that matters of chance might supervene
on matters of non-chance is through Humean supervenience, the view that all supervenes
on local matters of particular fact.
12) renders scientific naturalism an extreme form of physicalism on which Quine himself fails to be a scientific naturalist (owing to his endorsement of mathematicalia which do not supervene
on the physical).