To be an agent with a psychology--whether a pre-intentional, intentional, or inferring agent--the individual must veridically connect de se applications at different times to his own past, and must exercise purely preservative memory in ways that veridically fulfill de se presumptions and same-agent presuppositions of such memory.
To live a life as a person or other agent with a psychology--to exercise any of these three types of agency--the individual must successfully coordinate his acts and veridically coordinate his act-representations in ways that are immediately sensitive to his perspective, needs, and aims.
When they derive from the person's own past, the de se form is applied veridically. These quasi-memories, we may suppose, ate also memories.
McDowell proposes a disjunctive account of seeming to perceive that p: One will seem to perceive that p just in case either one really does perceive that p (veridically
) or one merely seems to perceive that p (nonveridically).
We propose a center in which free thought, free research into reality, free economic activity and ways of knowledge beyond those regarded as the "cognitive" are explored in an environment which treasures gradations of Being leading to the sacred, including computer programming that veridically
breaks out of current paradigms.
For what they say is not true that nothing is perceived determinately by signs, and that they <that is, the signs> do not vouch veridically
(verificant) for the thing; rather, signs which are the proper sensibles of a particular sense, reveal what they are to the proper sense when it is not deceived or hindered.
This too may help the physical environment; instead of a "vertical" attempt to realize ourselves through exploitation of the biosphere in new products, the notion that our subjectivity is more veridically experienced through a reflective path should be institutionalized through whatever means are appropriate in politics and/or civil society.
To assert, veridically, "I am" while remaining non-contradictive of cutting edge science and the other finest achievements of one's culture requires Himalayan efforts.
Its narrations get in the way of veridically apprehending reality.
It is this category to which he appeals in trying to justify commonsense belief in the existence of veridically
perceived external reality.
Here again, we must reject this framework; veridically
we see things, and nonveridically we seem to, without there being some mental thing common to each case.
It thematizes the epistemic subject as an essentially intuitive being and the epistemic object as a set of sensible entities waiting to be looked at and then veridically